Bureau of the Census
Institutional Affiliation: US Census Bureau
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2006||Micro and Macro Data Integration: The Case of Capital|
with John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, Shawn D. Klimek, Daniel J. Wilson
in A New Architecture for the U.S. National Accounts, Dale Jorgenson, J. Steven Landefeld, and William D. Nordhaus, editors
|January 2001||Costs of Air Quality Regulation|
with J. Vernon Henderson
in Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy, Carlo Carraro and Gilbert E. Metcalf, editors
|August 1999||Costs of Air Quality Regulation|
with J. Vernon Henderson: w7308
This paper explores some costs associated with environmental regulation. We focus on regulation pertaining to ground-level ozone (O3) and its effects on two manufacturing industries -- industrial organic chemicals (SIC 2865-9) and miscellaneous plastic products (SIC 308). Both are major emitters of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and nitrogen oxides (Nox), the chemical precursors to ozone. Using plant-level data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), we examine the effects of regulation on the timing and magnitudes of investments by firms and on the impact it has had on their operating costs. As an alternative way to assess costs, we also employ plant-level data from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey. Analyses employing average total ...
- Published as "Effects of Air Quality Regulation", American Economic Review, Vol. 86, no. 4 (September 1996): 789-813.
- Camaro, C.,and G. Metcalf (eds.) Distributional and Behavioral Effects of Environmental Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
|September 1997||Effects of Air Quality Regulation on in Polluting Industries|
with Vernon Henderson: w6160
This paper examines unintended effects of air quality regulation on decisions of major polluters, using plant data for 1963 to 1992. A key regulatory tool since 1978 is the annual designation of county air quality attainment status, where non-attainment status triggers specific equipment requirements for" new and existing plants. We find, in the later years of regulation, that, ceteris paribus, non-attainment status reduces expected births in polluting industries by 40-50%, resulting in a shift of polluting activity to cleaner, less populated attainment areas. Starting in the 1970s effects appear first for industries with bigger plant sizes and then, within industries, first for corporate plants relative to the much smaller non-affiliate, or single plant firm sector. In all industries,...